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789 
BETWEEN STATEHOOD AND SOMALIA: 
REFLECTIONS OF SOMALILAND STATEHOOD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, Somalia has lacked the basic characteristics of a 
state as recognized by the international community.
1
 At independence, 
Somalia—officially the Somali Republic after the union of former British 
Somaliland in the North and former Italian Somaliland in the South
2—was 
regarded as one of the least likely African countries to fall into the 
category of a ―failed state.‖3 The majority of Somalians are ethnically 
Somali; they share a similar adherence to Sunni Islam and nomadic 
pastoralism.
4
 Below these surface similarities, however, a deep division in 
history exists between the northern Somaliland and the southern region.
5
 
This division between the North and South has not only created tension in 
government, it has also led to civil war.
6
 
Out of the ashes of the North-South violence, Somaliland emerged as a 
de facto state.
7
 Saddled with early political and economic challenges, 
Somaliland ―has [since instituted] its own democratic government, police 
force, army, financial system, and currency.‖8 During the same period, 
Somalia has effectively ceased to exist. 
 
 
 1. See infra notes 73–90, 133–45 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 8–25 and accompanying text. 
 3. Ian S. Spears, Reflections on Somaliland & Africa’s Territorial Order, 30 REV. OF AFR. POL. 
ECON. 89, 92 (2003). ―In superficial terms, given that its commonalities in language, ethnic identity 
and religion make it unique among developing states, Somalia might once have been regarded as one 
of the least likely African countries to experience state breakup.‖ Id. 
 A ―failed‖ state is characterized by a ―government [that] is unable to discharge its basic 
governmental functions with respect to its populace and territory.‖ MICHAEL SCHOISWOHL, STATUS 
AND (HUMAN RIGHTS) OBLIGATIONS OF NON-RECOGNIZED DE FACTO REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE CASE OF ‗SOMALILAND‘ 26–27 (2004). Five basic governmental functions exist: (1) to 
exercise sovereign control over territory; (2) to have sovereign oversight and supervision of the 
nation‘s resources; (3) to exercise the effective and rational collection of revenue; (4) to maintain 
adequate national infrastructure, such as roads and telephone systems; and (5) to have the capacity to 
govern and to maintain law and order. Ali A. Mazrui, The African State as a Political Refugee: 
Institutional Collapse and Human Displacement, in AFRICAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE U.S. ROLE 
IN PEACEMAKING 9, 11 (David R. Smock & Chester A. Crocker eds., 1995). 
 4. MARK BRADBURY, AFRICAN ISSUES: BECOMING SOMALILAND 9 (2008). Many countries are 
multi-ethnic. In fact, ninety percent of the world‘s countries have two or more ethnic groups. MILTON 
J. ESMAN, ETHNIC POLITICS 2 (1994). 
 5. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 9. 
 6. See infra notes 32–41 and accompanying text. 
 7. Brad Poore, Somaliland: Shackled to a Failed State, 30 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 117, 117 (2007). 
 8. Id. 
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This Note recognizes that under international law, Somaliland is 
subject to the rule of law of the parent state, a rule firmly established by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Secession of Quebec.
9
 The 
Supreme Court of Canada, however, also developed remedial secession 
theory as a mechanism to enable a minority region to negotiate secession 
with the parent state.
10
  
By using remedial secession theory as a baseline, this Note argues that 
a minority region that lacks internal self-determination and the right to 
negotiate for secession but otherwise meets the requirements for statehood 
should be permitted to declare independence. Part II of this Note 
summarizes the competing historical, economic, and political traditions of 
the Republic of Somaliland and the Somali Republic. Part III offers an 
overview of the competing theories of recognition under international law. 
Part IV begins with an analysis of unilateral secession theory followed by 
an analysis of remedial secession as a competing theory. Part V argues 
that, absent internal self-determination and the right to negotiate for 
secession, remedial secession theory offers an avenue to Somaliland 
independence. Finally, Part VI discusses the potential ramifications of 
non-recognition, specifically focusing on terrorism.  
II. HISTORICAL SETTING 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the British began colonizing 
Somaliland.
11
 Because British interest was limited to coastal regions, its 
civil administration was rather lenient.
12
 As a result, traditional societal 
structures were kept autonomous from British rule.
13
 To fund its 
administration, however, the British relied heavily on imperial treasuries, 
resulting in the stagnation of the colony.
14
  
 
 
 9. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 112–13 (Can.).  
 10. Id. at 86–88, 97–98.  
 11. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 111. The northern orientation and proximity of Somaliland to 
the Gulf states has long distinguished it from Somalia. Spears, supra note 3, at 93. In 1839, the British 
began to occupy the port of Aden in present-day Yemen. As a result, Somaliland became vital to the 
protection of shipping routes and the maintenance of a steady meat supply. To secure these routes, 
several treaties were executed between the British government and territorial leaders in Somaliland. 
BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 25–26.  
 12. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 111. British indirect rule was intended to reinforce stable 
governance while limiting resistance to colonialism. Id. at 28.  
 13. See id. at 111.  
 14. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 30. ―[B]etween 1920 and 1940 the colony stagnated: a few roads 
were cleared, some agricultural projects were started, a few schools were built and some students were 
sent to Sudan for education . . . .‖ Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/5
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During this period, the Italian government was busy establishing its 
own ―sphere of influence‖ in southern Somalia.15 Unlike the British in 
northern Somalia, however, the Italian government was focused on 
complete control of the territory.
16
 Because of these different 
administrative policies, the British North lagged far behind the Italian 
south in infrastructure and skilled labor.
17
  
For a short period during the Second World War, the Italian 
government occupied British Somaliland.
18
 Within a year, however, 
British forces had reestablished control over the region.
19
 Following the 
war, British Somaliland was restored to protectorate status in 1948 while 
Italian Somaliland was placed under UN trusteeship.
20
 The trusteeship was 
intended to bring Italian Somaliland to independence.
21
 During this time, 
British interest in the North began to wane, accelerating the timetable for 
independence.
22
  
 
 
 15. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 98. 
 16. Peggy Hoyle, Somaliland: Passing the Statehood Test?, in IBRU BOUNDARY AND SECURITY 
BULLETIN 80, 80 (2000). ―The Italians intended to plant a colony of settlers and commercial 
entrepreneurs in the region . . . . The motivation was threefold: to ‗relieve population pressure at 
home,‘ to offer the ‗civilizing Roman mission‘ to the Somalis, and to increase Italian prestige through 
overseas colonization.‖ FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 14 (Helen C. 
Metz ed., 1993). The Italians developed large-scale projects in southern Somalia including a 
widespread plantation system. Id.  
 17. Id. Under UN trusteeship, the pace of development in Italian Somaliland far outpaced that in 
British Somaliland. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 31. While Somali development accelerated, British 
―benign neglect‖ left British Somaliland underdeveloped. Gérard Prunier, Somaliland Goes It Alone, 
97 CURRENT HISTORY 225–28 (1998). This disparity in development was further exacerbated 
following India‘s independence. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 32. Ultimately, the different economic 
and political patterns established the groundwork for significant problems during reintegration. 
FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 20. 
 18. Poore, supra note 5, at 123. From 1940 to 1941, the Italian military was able to unite the 
Ogaden region of Ethiopia with British and Italian Somaliland. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra 
note 14, at 14. Since colonization, the Somali clan had been divided under the political control of 
several foreign powers. Poore, supra note 5, at 123. The British exercised control over British 
Somaliland and the Somalis living in Kenya. Hoyle, supra note 12, at 80. The Italians controlled 
Italian Somaliland. Id. The French controlled French Somaliland, present day Djibouti. Id. The 
Ethiopians controlled the Somalis living in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Id. The Italian occupation 
represented the first reunification of a majority of the Somali clans since colonization. FEDERAL 
RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 14.  
 19. Poore, supra note 7, at 123; See also Hoyle, supra note 16, at 89. After retaking control of 
British Somaliland, British forces were also able to take control of Italian Somaliland and the Ogaden 
region of Ethiopia. Id.  
 20. Id. Italian trusteeship of Italian Somaliland was to be administered until independence. Id. 
The trusteeship required Italy to ―develop the colony‘s political institutions, to expand the educational 
system, to improve the economic infrastructure, and to give the indigenous people freedom of the press 
and the right to dissent.‖ FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 20.  
 21. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 31.  
 22. Id. at 32. ―In 1957 the first Legislative Council of Somaliland was formed and Somalis began 
to replace expatriate officials in government. In February 1960 elections were held for the Legislative 
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In the 1950s, Somali nationalism exploded.
23
 As a result, the concept of 
a ―Greater Somalia‖ obscured the underlying historical, political, and 
economic differences between the two regions.
24
 This perception of 
harmony was also nurtured by a ―common ‗colonial‘ past, [and] a 
somewhat shared Somali culture.‖25 Ultimately, the two regions 
determined that unification offered an opportunity to overcome colonial 
domination and exploitation.
26
  
On June 26, 1960, British Somaliland declared independence,
27
 and 
five days later, it united with Italian Somaliland to form the Somali 
Republic.
28
 After unification, the North drafted an Act of Union, sending it 
to the capital, Mogadishu.
29
 The document was never ratified by the 
legislative assembly in the South.
30
 Instead, the South passed the Atto di 
Unione, which differed significantly from the North‘s Act of Union.31 
Following its passage, the North became increasingly ―dissatisfied with 
the progress of the union argu[ing] that the act carried no force in the 
[N]orth because it had not been approved by the Somaliland legislature.‖32 
 
 
Assembly and two months later Britain formally agreed to grant the Protectorate independence . . . .‖ 
Id. 
 23. Id. at 31. During the 1950s, anti-colonial sentiment exploded throughout Africa. Id. In 
Somalia, this sentiment was fostered by the educated elite and exacerbated by emerging nationalist 
organizations. Id.  
 24. Mary J. Fox, Somalia Divided: The African Cerberus (Considerations of Political Culture), 2 
CIVIL WARS 1, 11 (1999). The leaders of Somalia entered the post-colonial era with no agenda for 
addressing underdevelopment. Instead, national leaders assumed integration would follow without 
considering the mechanisms for ensuring success as a unified territory. See AHMED I. SAMATAR, 
SOCIALIST SOMALIA: RHETORIC AND REALITY 48 (1988). See also I.M. LEWIS, A MODERN HISTORY 
OF THE SOMALI 179 (2002).  
 25. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 100. Italian and British Somaliland 
rushed headlong into immediate union—unconditional, unitary and poorly prepared . . . [t]his 
hasty decision put incredible, undeserved pressure on the politics and administration of the 
two territories. No committee had been appointed and charged with the official responsibility 
for drafting the legal instruments for the Union, and there was hardly any time for 
consultations. 
Hussein M. Adam, Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea, 21 
REV. OF AFR. POL. ECON. 21, 23 (1994).  
 26. Poore, supra note 7, at 123.  
 27. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 113. At independence, Somaliland possessed a handful of 
educated individuals and a single secondary school. Poore, supra note 7, at 123–24. It did not have a 
single paved road, and its principle natural resource was livestock. Id. 
 28. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 113.  
 29. Adam, supra note 25, at 23. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 33. Northern dissatisfaction was also exacerbated by inequality 
in the government. Poore, supra note 7, at 125. ―Somaliland‘s Prime Minister became only the 
Minister of Education ‗in a cabinet heavily dominated by southerners,‘ and Somaliland received just 
thirty-three seats in Parliament, in contrast to ninety-nine seats for southern Somalia.‖ Id. Additionally, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/5
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The North emphasized this dissatisfaction by boycotting the constitutional 
referendum.
33
  
On October 15, 1969, Somalia‘s parliamentary experiment came to an 
abrupt end with the assassination of President Sharmarke.
34
 The new 
regime that seized power
 
immediately suspended the constitution, 
imprisoned politicians, banned all political parties,
35
 and systematically 
deprived the North of development funds,
36
 causing a rapid deterioration 
in North-South relations.
37
 In response to Barre‘s repressive regime, the 
Isaaq clan formed the Somaliland National Movement (―SNM‖).38 In 
1988, the SNM launched an offensive on Hargeysa and Burco.
39
 In an 
 
 
the North was only marginally integrated because the Atto de Unione was drafted by Italian and 
southern Somali politicians. See Adam, supra note 25, at 23–24.  
 33. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 33. The Somali National League (―SNL‖) boycotted the 
constitutional referendum. Poore, supra note 7, at 125. In Somaliland, only 100,000 votes were cast 
with over 60 percent opposed to the constitution. Id. Because of the boycott, the north‘s vote 
represented slightly over five percent of the national vote. As a result, the south effectively exercised a 
veto on northern dissatisfaction. Id. 
 In December 1961, conflict between the two regions boiled over ―when a group of British-trained 
junior army officers in the north rebelled in reaction to the posting of higher ranking southern officers 
. . . to command their units.‖ FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 27. Following their 
capture, the soldiers were brought before ―[a] British judge presiding in Mogadishu . . . .‖ Poore, supra 
note 7, at 126. The judge, however, ―acquitted the officers on the grounds that the court had no 
jurisdiction over the State of Somaliland in the absence of an Act of Union.‖ Id. 
 34. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 35.  
 35. Id. at 35–36. Within a year of the coup d‘état, the Barre regime instituted ―scientific 
socialism.‖ Id. at 36. The ―Revolution‖ introduced an official Somali script, launched massive literacy 
campaigns, and pushed the nation into an ambitious program of social development. Poore, supra note 
7, at 127. While the strategy struck a chord in Somalia, it also produced one of Africa‘s most 
repressive regimes. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 36.  
 36. Adam, supra note 25, at 27. This policy made the North reliant on aid provided by local and 
foreign business elite.  
 37. Poore, supra note 7, at 126. Following the Ogaden War, a large population of Ogaden 
Somalis fled into northern Somalia. Hoyle, supra note 16, at 81. At its peak, more than one thousand 
refugees arrived daily. Poore, supra note 7, at 127. As a result, by 1981, Ogaden Somalis represented 
forty percent of the total northern population. Id. The majority of these refugees supported the Barre 
regime, sparking tribal conflicts. Hoyle, supra note 16, at 81. This also led many Northerners to feel 
disfavored for aid resources and civil service positions. Id. As anger intensified in the North, Barre 
quickly installed a refugee militia to control the region. See id. Eventually, northern Somalia ―‗began 
to look and feel like a colony under a foreign military tyranny.‘‖ Adam, supra note 25, at 27.  
 38. Poore, supra note 7, at 127–28. In January 1983, the SNM raided Mandheera Central Prison 
freeing one thousand political prisoners. Id. The Barre regime retaliated, ―[i]n the urban centers‖ by 
accelerating ―arbitrary arrests, detentions and executions.‖ Id. at 128 (citation omitted) (quoting 
another source).  
In the rural areas, the regime sought to undermine the SNM‘s support among nomads by 
destroying their livelihoods. Water points were declared off limits, closed, destroyed, 
poisoned, and mined. Commercial trucks were grounded, starving the rural community of 
food, medicines, and other consumer goods. Villages were razed to the ground and soldiers 
allowed to confiscate livestock without compensation.  
Id. at 128–29.  
 39. Id. at 129.  
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effort to undermine SNM support, Barre launched fighter pilots to bomb 
civilians throughout Somaliland.
40
 Ultimately, the SNM resistance and 
government counterattacks left ―50,000 dead in Hargeysa and hundreds of 
thousands dead in the rest of Somaliland.‖41 The civilians that survived the 
regime‘s bombings were rounded up in the streets and shot.42 Despite 
serious losses, in 1991 the SNM recaptured all major northern towns, 
bringing an end to North-South bloodshed.
43
 
In May 1991, the SNM convened the Great Conference of the Northern 
Peoples.
44
 At the conference, Somaliland revoked the Act of Union, and 
declared independence.
45
 Despite severing ties, Somaliland still faced 
considerable difficulties. Its infrastructure had been largely destroyed, a 
large amount of its population had fled, its army was without pay, and 
external aid was necessary to resurrect the economy.
46
 The SNM 
administration was also charged with drafting a national constitution.
47
  
In light of these challenges, violence erupted.
48
 To restore peace, the 
government expanded representation to include ―some 500 persons 
representing elders, religious leaders, politicians, retired civil servants, 
 
 
 40. Spears, supra note 3, at 94; see also FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, supra note 16, at 51. As 
a result of the bombings, the towns of Hargeysa and Burco were completely destroyed.  
 41. Poore, supra note 7, at 129.  
 42. Id. Since then, mass graves have been uncovered, demonstrating the ―most extreme attempt 
at genocide against the dominant Isaaq clan.‖ Id. (citation omitted) (quoting another source). 
Following their discovery in 1997, the government of Somaliland has sought to preserve these mass 
graves as reminders of the atrocities committed by southerners. See Spears, supra note 3, at 94; see 
also BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 250. Offering their rationale for preserving the mass graves, a 
prominent Somalilander explained:  
It‘s very important that we at least go and see those graves and feel sorry that this kind of 
thing can happen to human beings . . . . The only crime they were guilty of was just being 
human beings who wanted to decide on their own destiny; who called themselves 
Somalilanders and wanted to live where they had always lived, Somaliland, and not be part of 
any other kind of administration. Because the union with our brothers in Somalia just ended 
up in aerial bombings, killings and atrocities.  
Id. at 94–95. Spears, supra note 3, at 94–95.  
 43. Poore, supra note 7, at 129. On January 27, 1991, just two days prior to the SNM taking 
control of northern Somalia, the battle for Mogadishu culminated in the overthrow of Siad Barre. 
BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 78.  
 44. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 116. 
 45. Id. When the ―Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples‖ was convened, secession was not 
on the agenda. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 80–81. The SNM was fearful that the international 
community would be unwilling to recognize the regime. However, various factions were determined to 
cut ties with the South. Id. 
 46. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 117. 
 47. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 83.  
 48. Fighting began in Burco and spread to Berbera after government troops attempted to 
establish control over the port. Mark Bradbury et al., Choosing Politics Over Violence, 30 REV. OF 
AFR. POL. ECON. 455, 459 (2003). The conflict lasted ten months and resulted in one thousand deaths. 
BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 87.  
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intellectuals, businessmen, and others.‖49 These representatives agreed to 
establish a bicameral legislature to work with the President under an 
interim Constitution.
50
 At the conclusion of this interim term, the 
Assembly of Elders appointed Mohamed Egal to be President.
51
 
Despite making positive strides, the fragility of Somaliland was 
exposed when full-scale civil war erupted.
52
 The underlying conflict 
centered on ―unresolved issues of power sharing, historical divisions 
within the SNM,‖ and resource competition.53 The civil war between 
Clans in the North displaced over 180,000 people.
54
  
The civil war halted only after a second national reconciliation 
conference.
55
 At the conference, held in Hargeisa between October 1996 
and February 1997, President Egal was reelected, opposition parties were 
given a greater role in government,
56
 and an interim constitution was 
adopted.
57
 On May 31, 2001, a national referendum was held on the 
constitution and independence.
58
 It was ―reported that 1.18 million people 
voted, with 97.9 per cent approving the constitution.‖59  
In 2002, President Egal died during surgery.
60
 Clan violence appeared 
possible because Vice President Kaahin was of the Gadabuursi Clan, a 
 
 
 49. Poore, supra note 7, at 130.  
 50. Id. Furthermore,  
Article 10 of the National Charter established a government structure with an executive 
council as Government (Golaha Xukuumadda) on the one hand, and a bicameral legislature 
on the other. The Parliament consists of an Assembly of Elders (Guurti) as a non-elected 
upper house (Golaha Guurtida), and an Assembly of Representatives as an elected lower 
house (Golaha Wakiillada); the judiciary, auditor general, and the central bank were 
established as independent agencies.  
SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 119. Seats in the upper and lower houses of the legislature were 
proportionally allocated to the various clans. Bradbury et al., supra note 48, at 461. The Assembly of 
Elders plays an important role in Somaliland because it has the power to convene conferences, 
represent communities, and decide on political measures to resolve problems. Id.  
 51. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 119. During the first eighteen months of the Egal 
administration, progress was made in establishing government institutions, demobilizing the militia, 
creating a monetary system, and stabilizing the economy. Bradbury et al., supra note 48, at 461. 
 52. BRADBURY, supra note 4, at 115.  
 53. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 120. Control over the port of Berbera and its revenues ignited 
violence in 1992; control over the Hargeysa airport and its revenues created the spark in 1994. Id. at 
118.  
 54. Bradbury et al., supra note 48, at 461.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 122. 
 58. Id. ―With Article 2 of the constitution affirming Somaliland‘s independent status, the 
constitutional referendum of 31 May 2001 was effectively a vote on the status of Somaliland.‖ 
Bradbury et al., supra note 48, at 463. 
 59. Bradbury et al., supra note 48, at 463. It was widely reported by international observers that 
the referendum adhered to international standards. Id.  
 60. Id. The death of President Egal ―generated an outpouring of nationalist sentiment.‖ Id. His 
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different clan family than President Egal‘s Clan.61 Power passed 
peacefully, however, and later that year, district elections were held.
62
 
Presidential elections followed, resulting in the reelection of President 
Kaahin by 280 votes.
63
 The narrow margin, again, presented the possibility 
of violence, but election results were appealed democratically.
64
  
Since this conference, ―Somaliland has experienced a period of 
uninterrupted security.‖65 On June 26, 2010, Somaliland celebrated its 
50th anniversary of independence from Great Britain with presidential 
elections.
66
 After a tightly contested race, which independent observers 
recognized as well-organized and fair,
67
 President Kaahin was defeated by 
Ahmed Mohamud Silaanyo of the Isaaq Clan.
68
 Importantly, this election 
marked the second peaceful transition of power, as well as the second 
peaceful transition between clan families since 1991.
69
 Ultimately, 
Somaliland has demonstrated its resilience and has demonstrated that a 
return to violence is unlikely.  
 
 
funeral was observed by both supporters and opponents. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 466. District elections involved the selection of 332 Councillors in the six regions of 
Somaliland. These elections determined the three parties to contest parliamentary and presidential 
elections. Several problems existed in the electoral process because both voters and electoral officials 
lacked experience. Id. at 466–67.  
 63. Poore, supra note 7, at 133. Due to the problems experienced during district elections, 
polling stations were expanded, prison sentences were imposed for double voting, and polling officials 
were moved to stations away from their homes to prevent vote rigging. Bradbury et al., supra note 48, 
at 468. Despite voting reform, problems surfaced because of meager international financial support, 
voter illiteracy, and the limited differentiation between political platforms. Id. at 466–69.  
 64. Bradbury et al., supra note 48, at 469. Given the slim lead maintained by President Kaahin, it 
is not surprising an electoral challenge occurred. During the challenge, Kulmiye  
presented evidence of mathematical errors in the [Somaliland Electoral Commission‘s] final 
calculations. To his credit the chairman of Kulmiye did not accuse the [Somaliland Electoral 
Commission] or the government of malpractice. He resisted intense pressure from within his 
party to form an alternative government, stating that he had no intention of taking Somaliland 
down the path of Mogadishu, and committed Kulmiye to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.  
Id. Because of this commitment to democracy, the Supreme Court was given the task of reviewing the 
election results. Id.  
 65. Id. at 462. 
 66. Somaliland’s Elections: Not so Failing, THE ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 45, 45, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16488840?story_id=16488840&fsrc=rss. The Elections were ―marked 
with enthusiasm and little violence by its 1.07[] [million] registered voters (from a population of 
around 2.5[] [million]).‖ Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, New President of Somaliland Fights for Recognition, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/world/africa/04somaliland.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq 
=somaliland&st=cse. ―Silaanyo, a member of the dominant Issa[q] clan, studied economics in Britain 
and served in the government of former Somali president Mohamed Siad Barre.‖ Id. This transition to 
the dominant Isaaq tribe marked the second peaceful transition between different tribal groups since 
independence. Id.  
 69. Id.  
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III. GAINING RECOGNITION AS A STATE 
A. Theories of Recognition 
Two competing branches of statehood theory exist, each emphasizing 
the importance of recognition differently.
70
 Declaratory theory is premised 
on the objective criteria outlined under the Montevideo Convention.
71 
Conversely, constitutive theory provides that statehood is dependent on 
recognition by the international community.
72
 Despite widespread 
competition over theory application, no consensus has emerged.
73
 
1. Declaratory Theory 
Declaratory theory
 
is favored by most commentators, including the 
International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖).74 Under declaratory theory, 
statehood is recognized when four conditions are met, regardless of 
international consent.
75
 For a state to be recognized under the criteria 
initially contemplated at the Montevideo Convention, it must have (a) a 
permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government, and (d) 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
76
 
First under these criteria, a territory-seeking statehood must 
demonstrate that it possesses a permanent population.
77
 Permanence 
 
 
 70. William T. Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the State in State Recognition 
Theory, 27 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 115, 118 (2009).  
 71. Id. See also Alison K. Eggers, Note, When is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of 
Somaliland, 30 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 211, 214 (2007). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 118–19.  
 74. Eggers, supra note 71, at 214; Worster, supra note 70, at 119. The Second Circuit recently 
applied the standard outlined at the Montevideo Convention in Kadic v. Karadzic. Kadic v. Karadzic, 
70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996). The court was asked to 
determine whether a self-proclaimed republic, referred to as Srpska, was a state whose leadership 
could be liable for various atrocities carried out by its leaders. Id. It concluded that ―Srpska met the 
definition of a state by noting that it ‗is alleged to control defined territory, control populations within 
its power, and to have entered into agreements with other governments.‘‖ Eggers, supra note 68, at 
214 (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995)).  
 75. Poore, supra note 7, at 136.  
 76. The Montevideo Convention outlines the characteristics of a state in the international 
community. Statehood under the Montevideo Convention consists of four elements: ―(a) a permanent 
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the 
other States.‖ Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International 
Conference of American States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 20, 25 (1936)) 
[hereinafter ―Montevideo Convention‖].  
 77. Id. This does not mean that the state is comprised of a single ―people.‖ Rather, the state may 
include several distinct ―peoples.‖ DAVID RAIČ, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
58 (2002). 
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consists of two points: (1) a permanent population that intends on 
inhabiting the territory permanently,
78
 and (2) a habitable territory.
79
 
The second criterion for statehood, a defined territory, is lenient.
80
 
Despite the importance of territorial sovereignty, it is not a necessary 
prerequisite.
81
 In addition, the external boundaries of the state need not be 
explicitly defined.
82
 In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ held 
that there is ―no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully 
delimited and defined, and often . . . for long periods they are not . . . .‖83 
The third criterion is the existence of a government.
84
 A state is not 
required to follow any particular pattern of governance,
85
 however, it must 
assert authority effectively.
86
 Effective governance consists of two points: 
(1) internal governance, and (2) external governance.
87
 Internal 
governance is premised on the government‘s ability ―to establish and 
maintain a legal order . . . .‖88 External governance focuses on the 
government‘s ability to act autonomously.89 Ultimately, it is ―[t]he 
 
 
 78. Id. at 58–59. For example, 
[w]here a group of people occupies an island or an uninhabited territory not with the intention 
to move there but, for instance, solely for the purpose of gaining monetary benefits, there can 
be no question of statehood. The same applies with regard to a population which completely 
consists of refugees who have no other intention but to return to their home country. But the 
fact that large numbers of nomads are moving in and out of the country, as in the case of 
Somalia, is in itself no bar to statehood as long as there is a substantial number of permanent 
inhabitants.  
Id.  
 79. Id. An often cited example is Antarctica, which has a defined territory but does not have a 
permanent population. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 13. 
 80. Montevideo Convention, supra note 76.  
 81. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 59. See also Island of Palmas Case, (Neth. v. US), 20 R. Int‘l Arb. 
Awards 829, 838–40 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).  
 82. ―Even though Israel‘s boundaries have yet to be decisively delineated, Israel unquestionably 
exits as a state.‖ Hoyle, supra note 16, at 82. In determining statehood, ―it is enough that [the] territory 
has sufficient consistency, even though its boundaries have not yet been accurately delimited, and that 
the state actually exercises independent public authority over that territory.‖ Deutsche Continental 
Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State, 5 ANN. DIG.11, 15 (Germano-Polish Mixed arbitral Trib. 1929). 
 83. N. Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (F.R.G. v. Den./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 33, ¶ 46 (Feb. 20).  
 84. Montevideo Convention, supra note 73.  
 85. Western Sahara Case, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 3, 43–44 (Oct. 16). ―No rule of 
international law, in the view of the Court, requires the structure of a State to follow any particular 
pattern, as is evident from the diversity of the forms of State found in the world today.‖ Id.  
 86. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 14–15. The international community recognized Croatian 
sovereignty even though large parts of its territory were controlled by non-governmental forces. Hoyle, 
supra note 16, at 82.  
 87. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 15. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
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existence of functioning . . . administrative and legislative organs [that] 
will in general be a strong indicator for effective governance.‖90 
The final criterion for statehood is the capacity to enter into 
international relations.
91
 This language, however, betrays a requirement 
largely viewed as a consequence of statehood.
92
 As a result, theorists have 
argued whether this requirement entails the capacity or the ability to enter 
into relations.
93
 In the opinion of the American Law Institute, this 
requirement refers to the capacity to enter into international relations.
94
  
Ultimately, under declaratory theory, once the territory has met all four 
conditions, recognition as a state is mandated regardless of international 
consent.
95
 In practice, however, it is more likely the state will not obtain 
―international rights on the international plane until [it is] recognized.‖96 
As a result, declaratory theory may simply subject the state to a series of 
subjective criteria before providing the international community final veto 
power.  
2. Constitutive Theory 
Constitutive theory argues that statehood is not automatic, but rather 
requires recognition in the international community.
97
 This approach 
―stems from the shift in international law doctrine from natural law to the 
positivist theory, which is centered on consent as the essential element 
. . . .‖98 Ultimately, while declaratory theory draws support from theorists, 
 
 
 90. Id. at 16. ―[I]t has been argued that ‗if an entity has its own executive and other organs, 
conducts its foreign relations through its own organs, has its own system of courts and legal system 
and, particularly important, a nationality law of its own, then there is prima facie evidence of 
Statehood.‘‖ Id. (citation omitted) (quoting another source). 
 91. Montevideo Convention, supra note 76.  
 92. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 17. 
 93. Hoyle, supra note 16, at 82. Ian Brownlie has argued that this criterion is merely a proxy for 
the criterion of independence. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 
(5th ed. 1990). 
 94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 201 cmt. e (1987). ―An 
entity is not a state unless it has competence, within its own constitutional system, to conduct 
international relations with other states, as well as the political, technical, and financial capabilities to 
do so.‖ Id. 
 95. Poore, supra note 7, at 136. 
 96. Worster, supra note 70, at 119.  
 97. Id. at 120. 
 98. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 33. The constitutive approach stems largely from a shift from 
natural law to positivism, which focuses on ―consent as the essential element from which obligations 
under international law derive.‖ Id. Under positivism, the international community must consent to the 
admission of a new state because recognition creates additional obligations for existing states. In 
addition, new states are not bound by international law until consent is given. Id.  
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constitutive theory appears to more accurately reflect reality.
99
 This 
contention is borne out by the observation that ―only states sit on the 
United Nations Security Council, [and] only states petition the 
International Court of Justice . . . .‖100 
Despite the importance of recognition under constitutive theory, ardent 
supporters ―do not claim that recognition creates the State.‖101 Instead, 
existing states merely act as the gatekeepers to ensure that de facto states 
meet the criteria outlined under the Montevideo Convention.
102
 This de 
facto gatekeeper function makes recognition a political instrument, with 
powerful states effectively exercising veto power.
103
 It also means that 
until international ―personality‖ is granted, the state is not attributed any 
rights or duties.
104
 Ultimately, in absence of international recognition, a de 
facto state is unlikely to achieve complete statehood.
105
 
B. Uti Possidetis 
After a state is recognized, the doctrine of uti possidetis ―provides that 
new States will come to independence with the same borders that they had 
 
 
 99. Worster, supra note 70, at 120, 133–34. For example, Taiwan arguably meets the criteria set 
forth under the Montevideo Convention, but because of political circumstances, the international 
community has failed to recognize its statehood. Hoyle, supra note 16, at 82.  
 100. Worster, supra note 70, at 132. 
 101. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 30. ―It may well be possible to reconcile the declaratory theory with 
positivism, and it is certainly true that many writers have been both declaratory and positivist.‖ James 
Crawford, Outside the Colonial Context, in SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH 1, 17 
(W.J.A. Macartney ed., 1988).  
 102. See RAIČ, supra note 77, at 29–31.  
Where the facts are clear . . . the evidentiary value of recognition or non-recognition is not 
strong enough to affect the outcome; in such circumstances recognition is declaratory. But in 
borderline cases, where the facts are unclear, the evidential value of recognition can have a 
decisive effect; in such circumstances recognition is semi-constitutive.  
SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 42–43. 
 International personality requires a difficult determination of fact and law. As a result, recognition 
cannot be automatic. Rather, recognition requires:  
someone to perform that task. In the absence of a preferable solution, such as the setting up of 
an impartial international organ to perform that function, the latter must be fulfilled by States 
already existing. The valid objection is not against the fact of their discharging it, but against 
their carrying it out as a matter of arbitrary policy as distinguished from legal duty.  
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1948).  
 103. Worster, supra note 67, at 120–21. Political maneuvering means that a failed state may 
remain viable as a political tool in the international community. Poore, supra note 5, at 136. It also 
means that ―where doubts remain as to the factual fulfillment of the requirements necessary for 
statehood . . . recognition assumes an important (political) function: it translates international politics 
determined by domestic policies into international law.‖ SCHOISWOHL, supra note 2, at 43.  
 104. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 30. 
 105. Hoyle, supra note 16, at 82. 
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when they were . . . territories of one colonial power.‖106 This allowed 
colonial powers to limit fragmentation while maintaining the stability of 
international borders.
107
 During decolonization, the consensus in Africa 
was to deny secession.
108
 This intention was emphasized in the Charter of 
the Organization of African Unity, which affirmed the principle of respect 
for the ―sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence.‖109 And, the Cairo Resolution, 
which reaffirmed that ―all the states undertake to respect the boundaries 
exiting at . . . independen[ce].‖110 
An international boundary is established and assumes permanence 
through treaty or acquiescence.
111
 As post-colonial boundaries are 
formalized, uti possidetis is replaced by the concept of ―territorial 
integrity.‖112 Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, member states 
were required to ―preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the 
League.‖113 Similarly, the UN prohibits challenging the territorial integrity 
of the state through the threat or use of force.
114
 In the context of Africa, 
―territorial integrity‖ has resulted in a reluctance to support self-
determination.
115
  
IV. SECESSION 
A. Unilateral Secession 
Under international law, absent exceptional circumstances, a minority 
population is not afforded the right to unilateral secession.
116
 Exceptional 
circumstances exist where people are oppressed or subject to colonial 
 
 
 106. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 296. 
 107. Poore, supra note 7, at 137.  
 108. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 174–75.  
 109. Charter of the Organization of African Unity art. 3, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 74. 
 110. Resolutions Adopted by the First Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
held in Cairo, O.A.U Res. AHG/16(I), July 21, 1964. 
 111. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 296–97. 
 112. See Cambodia v. Thail., 1962 I.C.J. 6, 14 (15 June). See also Beagle Channel Arbitration 
between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile (Argentina v. Chile), Report and 
Decision of the Court of Arbitration, 52 I.L.R. 121, 131 (1977), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod 
/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf. 
 113. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 293.  
 114. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.  
 115. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 175–76. ―The OAU has not abstained from its rigid reference 
to the principles of territorial integrity . . . in the case of Somaliland.‖ Id. at 176.  
 116. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 103–05 (Can.). 
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rule.
117
 Majority support within the secessionist region, however, is not 
sufficient.
118
 In the Ǻland Islands Question, the League of Nations held 
that ―international law does not recognize the right of national groups . . . 
to separate themselves from the state of which they form part by the 
simple expression of a wish.‖119 More recently, the UN has refused to 
admit a secessionist region against the wishes of the parent state.
120
 As a 
result, secession is primarily governed by the law of the parent state.
121
  
B. Remedial Secession 
The concept of remedial secession is primarily focused on the ―right of 
a people to participate . . . in the decision-making processes of the 
State.‖122 Absent effective mechanisms, a minority population is often 
excluded from the economic and political processes of the state.
123
 They 
may also be subjected to domination or subjugation.
124
 Under remedial 
secession theory, these exclusions from participation in the government 
enable the minority region to form a state to govern itself.
125
 With the 
 
 
 117. Id. at 104–05. 
 118. Poore, supra note 7, at 138. ―Case law does not support the idea that a secessionist region has 
an inalienable right to unilateral secession because a majority of the population in that region desires it. 
The Basque and Catalan regions in Spain and the Quebec region of Canada are cases in point.‖ Id.; see 
also Åland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the 
Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7.21/68/106 (1921) [hereinafter Ǻland Islands 
Question].  
 119. Id. ―In the Ǻland Islands case, the League of Nations appointed two bodies of experts to 
examine whether . . . the community inhabiting the Ǻland Islands . . . [was] free to secede from 
Finland and join the Kingdom of Sweden.‖ SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 72 n.252.  
 120. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 390 (2006).  
 121. Id. at 391. International law contains no explicit conditions pertaining to the legality of 
secession. However, the United Nations Security Council has frequently characterized both the 
Katangan and Rhodesian secessions as illegal. Id. at 389.  
 122. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 237.  
 123. Poore, supra note 7, at 139.  
 124. See RAIČ, supra note 77, at 241. Buchheit argues that secession is warranted in the case of ―a 
denial of political freedom and/or human rights.‖ BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 94 (1978). This argument is reinforced by the Vienna Declaration, which requires 
that the government represent ―the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any 
kind.‖ Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) 
[hereinafter ―Vienna Declaration‖], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/ 
(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en.  
 125. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 234. Furthermore, 
the right of self-determination is of particular importance because its realization is an 
essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and 
for the promotion and strengthening of those rights . . . With regard to paragraph 1 of article 
1 [of the Human Rights Covenants], States parties should describe the constitutional and 
political processes which in practice allow the exercise of this right.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
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exception of Reference re Secession of Quebec, however, no international 
body has recognized a legal remedy through which a minority region may 
enforce its right to self-determination.
126
 
In Reference Re Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada 
subjected ―the potentially destructive issue of secession to the rule of 
law.‖127 The Court held that if a ―clear majority‖ of a minority region 
favors secession, then the parent state government has a duty to negotiate 
the possible secession.
128
 In conducting negotiations, the government must 
consider the rule of law, democracy, federalism, and the protection of 
minority rights.
129
  
Where a minority group is ―denied meaningful access to the 
government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural 
development‖ it may be able to secede unilaterally.130 In this regard, the 
concept of remedial secession mirrors ―dissolving secession.‖ Dissolving 
secession posits that ―a State [may be created] without the consent of the 
former sovereign, which in view of its collapse and lack of effective 
(central) governance has at least temporarily de facto ceased to exist as a 
State.‖131 Absent remedial or dissolving secession, state dissolution could 
effectively deny a minority region the right to petition for the right to 
secede.  
The concept of ―internal colonialism‖ provides another variation of 
remedial secession theory. Under the internal colonialism approach, the 
 
 
 See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www2 
.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm. Article 1(1) of the ICCPR, provides that ―[a]ll peoples have the right 
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.‖ Furthermore, under Article 1(3) of the 
ICCPR, ―[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right 
of self-determination, and shall respect that right . . . .‖ Id.  
 See also African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
Rev. 5 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 [hereinafter African Charter], available at 
http://www.achpr .org/english/_info/charter_en.html. Under Article 20(1) of the African Charter, ―[a]ll 
peoples . . . shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination.‖ It continues by 
emphasizing that accordingly all peoples ―shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue 
their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen.‖ Id.  
 126. Cf. Poore, supra note 7, at 140. 
 127. Id. at 139 (citation omitted) (quoting another source). 
 128. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 97–98 (Can.). 
 129. Id. at 85. 
 130. Id. at 121. 
 131. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 50 (emphasis in original). Generally, the international 
community will be ―confronted with a factually collapsed ‗parent‘ State, which continues to exist on 
the presumption of continuity, while one part of it (or more) breaks away to form a State on its own.‖ 
Id. at 51.  
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―right to territorial separation of a people within an existing State is 
closely linked to certain elements of the traditional concept of 
colonialism.‖132 Internal colonialism has also been applied in certain 
circumstances to minority populations within a parent state.
133
 
A territory is prima facie non-self-governing if it is geographically 
separate and ethnically distinct from the ―country administering it‖. 
Geographical separateness has usually been taken to require 
separation across land or sea . . . but there is no good reason why 
other defining characteristics, including historical boundaries or de 
facto boundaries . . . might not also be relevant.
134
  
In the case of historical boundaries or ethnic groups, the minority region 
must be placed in the position or status of a subordinate.
135
 This 
subordinate status of the minority population causes internal colonialism 
to bear a striking resemblance to remedial secession theory.  
Ultimately, however, the concept of ―[r]emedial secession envisions a 
scheme by which . . . international law recognizes a continuum of 
remedies ranging from protection of individual rights, to minority rights, 
and ending with secession as the ultimate remedy.‖136 It is the severity of 
the treatment of the minority population that will legitimize the right to 
self-determination.
137
 Therefore, the existence of certain circumstances 
permits remedial secession, but also explicitly prohibits unilateral 
secession.
138
  
 
 
 132. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 326 (citation omitted).  
 133. Id. at 326–27.  
 134. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 327 (citation omitted) (quoting another source). See also T.M. 
Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right of Secession, PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INT‘L LAW 
13–14 (Brolmann et al. eds., 1993). In the case of a minority region, which is ―persistently and 
egregiously . . . denied political and social equality‖ it is conceivable that international law will define 
such repression as colonialist in nature. As a result, if repression is recognized as colonial, the minority 
region would be given the right of decolonization. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. BUCHHEIT, supra note 124, at 222. Related to remedial secession is the concept of ―the 
democratic entitlement‖ theory. However, while remedial secession theory appears similar to the 
democratic entitlement theory, the two theories differ concerning the secession process. Under the 
democratic entitlement theory, the minority group is able to ―opt out‖ based on displeasure with the 
majority. Poore, supra note 7, at 138. However, under remedial secession theory, negotiations must 
occur between the minority region and the government. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 
2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 86–88 (Can.). The duty to negotiate is triggered when a ―clear majority‖ of the 
region favors secession. Id. Ultimately, these negotiations will be determined by principles of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, democracy, federalism, and the protection of minority rights. Id. 
para. 85.  
 137. Id. 
 138. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 234.  
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V. THE RECOGNITION AND SECESSION OF SOMALILAND 
A. Theories of Recognition 
1. Somaliland Under Declaratory Theory 
The Republic of Somaliland meets the requirements set forth under the 
Montevideo Convention. It has a permanent population, a defined 
territory, a functioning government, and has the ability to enter into 
relations with other states. As a result, declaratory theory should recognize 
the Republic of Somaliland as a state within the international community.  
Somaliland meets the first criterion with its growing, yet defined, 
population despite the nomadic nature of its inhabitants. In 1999, 
Somaliland had a defined population of 3,390,000.
139
 Since then, 
Somaliland‘s defined population has likely experienced a marked increase 
due to continued repatriation.
140
 As the population of Somaliland has 
grown, various clan families have started to significantly identify with the 
territory.
141
 Indeed, Somaliland‘s large nomadic population poses no 
impediment to recognition because a substantial number of permanent 
inhabitants remain.
142
  
The second criterion is met because the territorial boundaries of 
Somaliland stretch 68,000 square miles, corresponding roughly to its 
colonial boundaries.
143
 The territory includes five former regions of 
Somalia, however, its eastern border has been the subject of constant 
dispute.
144
 As a result of this territorial conflict, ―it might be contested that 
Somaliland has a clearly defined territory.‖145 Nevertheless, international 
law does not require definitively drawn boundaries.
146
 
 
 
 139. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 166.  
 140. Id. The population of Somaliland likely increased after violence with Somalia subsided and 
the nation‘s civil war concluded. Id.  
 141. Hoyle, supra note 16, at 83.  
 142. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 166. ―There is no discernable reason why Somaliland‘s 
population should in this respect be treated differently than Somalia‘s, which has been said to qualify 
as a State despite its nomadic people.‖ Id. at 166 n.623; see also RAIČ, supra note 77. 
 143. Hoyle, supra note 14, at 80. Ethiopia recently signed an agreement for use of the Port of 
Berbera. This agreement demonstrates the territorial integrity of Somaliland. Eggers, supra note 71, at 
218.  
 144. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 166. Puntland, a semi-autonomous region within Somalia, lies 
directly to the east of Somaliland, and has continued to emphasize its control over the regions of 
Sanaag, Sool, and Buhoodle. Hoyle, supra note 16, at 81.  
 145. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 166. 
 146. Id.  
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Somaliland also has a clearly defined government, thereby meeting the 
third criterion. The government has held a referendum on the constitution 
and staged several peaceful elections.
147
 In addition, the 
[g]overnment appears to have ―general control of its territory, to the 
exclusion of other entities[,‖] and to have established ―some degree 
of maintenance of law and order[;‖] furthermore, there seems to be 
internal stability, popular support for the government as evidenced 
by a free vote, and a working constitution.
148
 
Despite exercising territorial control, Somalia has never recognized 
Somaliland independence. Absent recognition, the threat remains that 
Somalia could reconsolidate the region. It is unlikely, however, that 
Somalia could exert control over the region to the exclusion of the 
government of Somaliland.
149
 
Finally, Somaliland has exhibited the ability to enter into relations with 
other states. Since independence, ―numerous states have received 
delegations from Somaliland, and international organizations have to some 
extent created semi-formal relationships.‖150 In addition, Somaliland 
exhibited state-like behavior when it ―signed a long-term use agreement 
. . . for use of [the] Port of Berbera‖ with Ethiopia.151 Ultimately, the 
government of Somaliland has shown it can control internal policies, and 
no rival parties have challenged its external voice. While Somaliland has 
struggled to establish diplomatic ties, this inability does not limit its 
capacity to enter into relations.
152
  
 
 
 147.  Eggers, supra note 71, at 218. Somaliland‘s presidential election was closer than the one 
between George W. Bush and Al Gore. Following the election, the court system was charged with 
conducting a recount to declare the winner. Despite some unhappiness over the procedure, the 
population and the candidates accepted the decision. Id. Following the presidential elections, 
parliamentary elections were held, and ―were accepted and endorsed by all three political parties.‖ Id.  
 148. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 166. Less significant, Somaliland has adopted a flag, a coat of 
arms, and a national anthem. In addition, the Government has issued currency, stamps and passports. 
Hoyle, supra note 16, at 83.  
 149. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 167. ―Moreover, it has been suggested, that the threshold of 
effectiveness is lowered in cases of ‗dissolving secession,‘ where the ‗mother‘ State continues to exist 
merely on the basis of a presumption under international law.‖ Id. (citations omitted). 
 150. Id. ―Somaliland has been received by ministers and governmental representatives in foreign 
states, including the United Kingdom and the United States.‖ Eggers, supra note 68, at 219. During his 
term, President Kaahin also visited the United Kingdom, Germany, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Rwanda, Zambia, and Uganda to press for independence. Id. More importantly, however, Ethiopia 
recently established an embassy in Somaliland. Id.  
 151. Id. at 218.  
 152. Id. at 219. Somaliland has struggled to enter into relations because the international 
community continues to recognize the territorial integrity of Somalia. As a result, Somaliland ―cannot 
enter into formal trade agreements with other nations and has understandable difficulty in seeking, and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/5
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2. Somaliland Under Uti Possidetis 
The concept of uti possidetis underscores the complexity of the 
relationship between Somalia and Somaliland. If uti possidetis is strictly 
construed such that Somaliland‘s border is defined by that of its colonial 
past, the secessionist claims of Somaliland are strengthened: the Atto de 
Unione between Somaliland and Somalia altered colonial boundaries, in 
violation of uti possidetis.
153
 Despite this violation, a claim for 
independence under uti possidetis may prove illusory since unification 
occurred five decades ago. Moreover, the international community 
supports the legality of Somalia‘s and Somaliland‘s union, presenting a 
further obstacle to secession.
154
 
Despite international support of the union, Somaliland‘s separation 
from Somalia would not be the first dissolution in Africa.
155
 The concept 
of state dismemberment is not new to the international community; in fact, 
the international community recently allowed the dismemberment of 
Yugoslavia into constituent republics.
156
 This strategy of dissolution 
appears even more applicable where a voluntary union has failed.
157
 
B. Theories of Secession 
1. Unilateral Secession 
Under international law, a minority region is not afforded the right to 
unilateral secession.
158
 Rather, the minority region is subject to the law of 
the parent state.
159
 In the case of Somaliland, it would be subject to rule of 
law in Somalia; the ―vote for independence by ninety-seven percent‖ of 
 
 
certainly securing, any sort of assistance from world financial organizations.‖ Poore, supra note 5, at 
133 (citation omitted) (quoting another source). 
 153. Id. at 141–42. The original union would be delegitimized because borders creating the 
Somali Republic clashed with those delineated during colonization. Id. at 142. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. Several African unions have dissolved since decolonization. These include the unions 
between ―Egypt-Syria (1958–61), Mali-Senegal (1960), and Senegal-Gambia (1982–89).‖ Id. at 142; 
see also Iqbal Jhazbhay, Somaliland: Africa’s Best Kept Secret, a Challenge to the International 
Community? 12(4) AFR. SEC. REV. 79 (2003), available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No4/ 
Jhazbay.pdf.  
 156. Poore, supra note 7, at 142. Further, the international community recently allowed the 
dismemberment of another African nation, Sudan. Jeffrey Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, South 
Sudan Becomes a New Nation, NY TIMES (July 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/ 
africa/10sudan.html?pagewanted=all.  
 157. Id.  
 158. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 103–05 (Can.). 
 159. Id. 
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the population of Somaliland would be insufficient to enable unilateral 
secession.
160
 While international law also envisions the right to petition for 
secession, in the case of Somaliland, the ability to petition Somalia creates 
an ―impasse . . . from which to apply for secession.‖161 
2. Remedial Secession 
Under international law, no remedies exist for a minority region to 
independently enforce the right of self-determination.
162
 The Supreme 
Court of Canada in Reference re Secession of Quebec envisioned that the 
parent state and the minority region would negotiate the terms of 
secession.
163
 However, the Court ―[did] not explicitly address what 
happens when a central government is unable (as opposed to unwilling) to 
negotiate.‖164 
Despite the absence of an enforcement mechanism, the international 
community has adopted several instruments characterizing the right of 
self-determination, such as the ICCPR,
165
 the Friendly Relations 
Declaration,
166
 the OSCE Helsinki Final Act,
167
 the African Charter on 
 
 
 160. See id. para. 143.  
 161. See Eggers, supra note 71, at 217.  
 162. RAIČ, supra note 77, at 326. 
 163. Reference re Secession of Quebec, para. 97. 
 164. Poore, supra note 7, at 144.  
 165. ICCPR, supra note 125. Under article 1(1) of the ICCPR, ―[a]ll peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.‖ Id. art. 1(1). Further, article 1(3) of the ICCPR states that 
―[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right 
of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations.‖ Id. art. 1(3).  
 166. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 
U.N. Doc. A/Res/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Doctrine], available at  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement. 
Under the Friendly Relations Declaration, the right to self-determination is not consummated once 
independence has been attained. The Friendly Relations Declaration states:  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.  
Id. at 124 (emphasis added).  
 167. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) 
[hereinafter Helsinki Final Act], available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en 
.pdf. Principle VIII states:  
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Human and Peoples‘ Rights,168 and the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human 
Rights.
169
 The Friendly Relations Declaration is particularly relevant to 
Somalia because it limits the protections of territorial integrity to 
―sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance 
with the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
. . . .‖170 Somalia‘s extensive violations of equal rights and self-
determination undermine its right to territorial integrity. During 
ratification of the Atto de Unione, Somaliland was denied the right to 
freely determine its political status. The original referendum on the Somali 
Constitution was denied by a majority of the population of Somaliland.
171
 
However, the large population differential between the two regions 
allowed Southern Somalia to effectively exercise veto power.
172
  
Somaliland has also been denied the right to pursue economic 
development. Because the Somali government is the sole body recognized 
to act on the international plane, Somaliland cannot negotiate with 
international monetary institutions.
173
 As a result, when Somali beef was 
boycotted, for example, Somaliland was forced to bear this economic 
burden.
174
  
 
 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always 
have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and 
external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their 
political, economic, social and cultural development.  
Id. para. 2. 
 168. African Charter, supra note 125. Article 20(1) of the African Charter states: ―[a]ll people . . . 
shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination.‖ Id. art. 20(1). Further, all 
people ―shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social 
development according to the policy they have freely chosen.‖ Id. 
 169. Vienna Declaration, supra note 124. The Vienna Declaration reaffirms that ―[a]ll peoples 
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status, 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.‖ Id. ¶ 2. Further, the Vienna 
Declaration recognizes  
The right of peoples to take any legitimate action, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, to realize their inalienable right of self-determination. The World Conference 
on Human Rights considers the denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of 
human rights and underlines the importance of the effective realization of this right. 
Id. 
 170. Friendly Relations Doctrine, supra note 166 (emphasis added); Poore, supra note 7, at 146 
(emphasis added). In Åland Island, the League of Nations determined that secession might be available 
as a ―last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective 
guarantees‖ of minority rights. Åland Islands Question, supra note 118, at 4.  
 171. Adam, supra note 25, at 25.  
 172. Poore, supra note 7, at 144.  
 173. SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 137.  
 174. Id. Since Saudi Arabia lifted its livestock ban, Somaliland has suffered from another ―ban on 
livestock exports from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf states . . . for fear of Rift Valley fever.‖ 
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Somaliland‘s situation differs markedly from the process envisioned in 
Reference re Secession of Quebec, in which the Supreme Court of Canada 
intended secession to be subject to the rule of law.
175
 Because the 
population of Quebec exercised the right to internal self-determination, it 
was denied the ability to unilaterally secede.
176
 Nevertheless, the 
population of Quebec was granted the right to negotiate with the Canadian 
government for secession.
177
 In contrast, in Somaliland these channels are 
completely unavailable. Since Somaliland declared independence, Somalia 
has been engulfed in violence.
178
 During this period, the government has 
struggled to maintain the vital public functions of the state.
179 
More 
importantly, Somalia, ―possessing no national government [has lacked] all 
of the attributes of statehood.‖180 As a result, the rest of the country has 
been left without any protections afforded by the state. It has also left 
Somaliland without the right to internal self-determination. Ultimately, 
remedial secession would allow the people of Somaliland to recognize the 
political, social, and economic rights they have been denied since 1969. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While recognition under traditional statehood theory has proven 
limited, Somaliland maintains hope that it will eventually be recognized.
181
 
Since independence, Somaliland has recognized widespread democratic 
success. Its electoral process has been widely celebrated by western 
observers, and it is a nation that continues to grow economically, 
politically, and socially.
182
 Though Somaliland would benefit from 
recognition, the international community continues to leave it 
unrecognized.
183
  
 
 
Somaliland: The Nation Nobody Knows, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2001, at 42, 42.  
 175. Poore, supra note 7, at 139. 
 176. Id. at 145.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Hoyle, supra note 16, at 85.  
 179. Id. Somalia has ―no police force, judiciary, civil service, electricity or postal service.‖ Id. 
Further, many government facilities have been looted or destroyed. Id.  
 180. Id. at 83. 
 181. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, supra note 68.  
 182. Bradbury et al., supra note 48, at 475–76.  
 183. The international community‘s failure to recognize Somaliland may also threatens 
international security. Following the events of September 11th, the United States has been especially 
cognizant of ―failed‖ states. Cf. Poore, supra note 7, at 121. A failed state poses a potential risk 
because it is ―unable to discharge its basic governmental functions with respect to its populace and 
territory.‖ SCHOISWOHL, supra note 3, at 26–27. In many cases, this lack of government oversight 
enables terrorist organizations to exploit the lawless territory. Poore, supra note 7, at 121. This 
lawlessness was underscored by Greg Mills in a recent report ―linking regional terrorism to the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/5
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The international community has expressed concern that secession 
would open the door for numerous minority regions to claim 
independence. For example, ―Russia has been unsympathetic to calls for 
recognition because recognition of Somaliland would have direct 
implications on Russia‘s position on Chechnyan independence.‖184 
However, strict application of remedial secession theory avoids permitting 
Chechnyan secession. Under remedial secession theory, Chechnya would 
still be required to negotiate with Russia for secession. As a result, 
remedial secession will only present a risk where the parent state has 
effectively ceased to exist. In all other circumstances, remedial secession 
theory merely reaffirms the right of a minority region to internal self-
determination and the right to negotiate for secession.  
The Republic of Somaliland faces an unproductive choice between 
attempting reconciliation with a failed state or continued non-recognition 
by the international community. While each choice offers the potential for 
 
 
disintegration of the Somali state,‖ and alleging that attacks have been ―carried out by an Al-Qaeda 
cell, some members of which may still be at large in Mogadishu.‖ Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 
another source). ―For almost four years the radical al Shabaab movement has been engaged in a violent 
struggle with the UN-backed transitional government for control of Somalia, which has had no 
effective administration since Mohamed Siad Barre's regime collapsed in 1991.‖ Paul Armstrong, 
Somali Militants Ready to Terrorize the World?, CNN (July 23, 2010), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/ 
WORLD/africa/07/13/somalia.alshabaab.profile/?fbid=x0K4R4wIN0V. In [July,] al Shabab claimed 
responsibility for a bomb attacks in Kampala that killed 74 people. Id. Recently, al Shabaab has gained 
control over much of central and southern Somalia. It has also solidified its connection with Osama bin 
Laden after he made statements calling for Muslims to ―‗help the Somali mujahedeen fight until 
Somalia is an Islamic state.‘‖ Id. While the deterioration of Somalia poses a significant international 
security threat, a stable government in Somaliland would reduce this threat by ―giv[ing] terrorists less 
room to maneuver and less flexibility in their operations.‖ Poore, supra note 7, at 121. 
 Moreover, the challenge of preventing piracy in the Horn of Africa may also be compounded by a 
failure to recognize Somaliland. Even without international recognition, Somaliland has been able to 
successfully capture, try and sentence individuals accused of piracy. Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Org., Somaliland: Court Sentences Pirates to 15 Years in Prison (Feb. 16, 2010), http:// 
www.unpo.org/content/view/10727/142/. ―Somaliland and Kenya are the only two countries in the 
Horn of Africa to have successfully captured, tried and sentenced people accused of piracy in the 
region.‖ Id. Despite this success, piracy is a major business bringing £20 million from ransom 
payments per year. David Blair, Somali Pirate Port Becomes Boomtown, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 18, 
2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/3479001/Somali-
pirate-port-becomes-boom-town.html. In Puntland, an autonomous region directly to the east of 
Somaliland, piracy ranks among the biggest currency earners and job creators: 
Piracy has created an abundance of employment in the port of Eyl. All this creates jobs 
especially for people who refit and maintain fast boats. When hostages are brought to the 
port, they must be fed during their long period of captivity. Some restaurants in Eyl have 
reportedly been established especially for this purpose. Meanwhile, new villas are springing 
up along the coast and the town‘s streets are filled with expensive cars.  
Id. Absent recognition, the lure of significant wealth offered through piracy may prove too enticing a 
business for Somaliland, one of the world‘s more impoverished countries. Poore, supra note 7, at 117. 
 184. Id. at 121.  
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equal rights and self-determination in the future, both routes come marked 
with innumerable pitfalls and potential disasters. Ultimately, this Note 
recognizes that under international law, Somaliland is subject to the rule of 
law of the parent state. Further, it recognizes that under constitutive 
theory, Somaliland fails to meet the requirements for international 
recognition. However, this Note proposes that where a ―minority region‖ 
has met the requirements for recognition under declaratory theory, and the 
parent state is unable to negotiate for secession, the minority region should 
be permitted to seek equal rights and self-determination through remedial 
secession.
185
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